

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Yugoslavia*

## 7. YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS ADAMANT IN DISPUTE WITH MOSCOW

### Comment on:

~~████████~~ FBIS

26 Feb 57

~~FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY~~

US Emb Belgrade

27 Feb 57

~~FOR OFFICIAL  
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In his speech to the Yugoslav parliament on 26 February, Foreign Minister Popovic clearly affirmed his country's refusal to back down in its dispute with the USSR, but professed a strong desire to carry on good state relations with the Soviet bloc countries. Popovic characterized Stalinism in the period since World War II as inflicting "incomparably greater damage to the cause of socialism than all imperialist conspiracies put together." Implying that Belgrade might now step up its ideological attacks, he pointed out that its recent silence had been misinterpreted by Moscow as weakness.

Popovic decried Moscow's withholding of investments promised to Yugoslavia. He observed that the Soviet attitude toward Belgrade was engendered in large part by Moscow's disappointment in its expectations that Yugoslavia would join the "so-called Socialist camp." In contrast Popovic observed that in spite of differing political systems, Yugoslav co-operation with the West was becoming stronger, and he praised "precious" American economic aid.

The foreign minister's statements on general world problems reflected a more even balance between East and West than did the Yugoslav view in 1956. ██████████

██████████ has suggested that this, along with Popovic's failure to endorse the Soviet position on German policy in a recent press interview, may represent a threat to Moscow of withdrawal of support on international issues and also a hint to the West that Yugoslav positions may be revised in its favor. ██████████

1 Mar 57

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*Yugoslavia*

## 6. YUGOSLAVS SUPPORT KADAR REGIME

### Comment on:

■ FBIS  
11 Jan 57  
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Several recent actions by the Yugoslav government indicate that it intends to support the Kadar regime in Hungary for the present. On 11 January, a Yugoslav spokesman announced that a \$2,000,000 credit and "certain facilities in mutual trade exchange" had been granted at the recent request of the Hungarian government. He said Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were "normal" and implied that Belgrade was no longer pressing the issue of the Soviet abduction of ex-premier Nagy last November.

A new Yugoslav ambassador is about to depart for Budapest, a post vacant since shortly after the Nagy kidnapping, and Hungary has named a new man for its post in Belgrade, vacant since late October. The Belgrade press gave tentative acceptance to the program outlined by Premier Kadar on 6 January, despite its heralding of impending harsh policies and close allegiance to Moscow.

Most Yugoslav Communist leaders probably recognize that only a harsh program by Kadar will maintain Communism in Hungary at present, even though this view conflicts with Vice President Kardelj's speech on 7 December, with its implied condemnation of the Kadar regime and its extolling of the workers' councils as the only true socialist force in Hungary. The Yugoslavs may feel that eventually a more liberal regime can evolve in Hungary.

Belgrade's attitude toward Hungary may also be in part designed to counter the Soviet bloc ideological criticisms of the Yugoslavs as "revisionists." ■

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*Yugoslavia*

6. YUGOSLAVS SAY <sup>✓x</sup> USSR EXERTING PRESSURE THROUGH ECONOMIC RELATIONS

US Emb Belgrade  
11 Jan 57

~~FOR OFFICIAL~~

~~USE ONLY~~

Vice President Vukmanovic-Tempo has told US officials that all Yugoslav economic relationships with Russia are slowing down, probably reflecting a direct attempt to apply pressure on Yugoslavia.

He specifically mentioned Soviet performance on the credits to finance a fertilizer plant and the USSR-East German jointly sponsored aluminum plant. Tempo does not expect an economic blockade such as occurred after 1948, however.

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official in charge of economic affairs, Vladimir Velebit, told [REDACTED] on 11 January that the USSR had intimated it wanted to postpone its investment credits for two years. Although Velebit thought this may have been partly caused by the heavy demands on Soviet production from China and the Satellites, he also feared it may be for purposes of political pressure on Yugoslavia.

Comment

Reports of Soviet economic pressure on Yugoslavia have come only from Belgrade officials, who may want to impress the United States with its continued need for Western economic support. There has been a delay in trade negotiations for 1957, but several recent Yugoslav trade agreements with the Satellites have called for an increase in trade.

The total Soviet foreign economic program, including recently increased aid to Eastern Europe, is still quite small in relation to total Soviet resources. In the light of Yugoslavia's sensitivity on "aid without political strings," it is doubtful that the USSR would exert heavy economic pressure on Belgrade, unless it were willing to risk a break with Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

13 Jan 57

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
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*Yugoslavia*



On 7 December, Yugoslav vice president Kardelj told the National Assembly that Yugoslavia had accepted the second Soviet intervention in the hope that it would lead to a Hungarian regime, including Nagy elements, attuned to the desires of the working masses. Such an orientation, he said, could have been accomplished through the workers' councils, which represented true socialist tendencies. He said the Kadar government had displayed other tendencies, as illustrated by the violation of the agreement on Nagy, and he clearly implied that the Yugoslavs might eventually drop all support for Kadar as well as their acquiescence in the Soviet intervention.

Comment

Belgrade apparently intended the withdrawal of its ambassador to Budapest to put pressure on the Soviet Union over Hungary, and it is continuing the exchange of notes with the Kadar government over the Nagy abduction.


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30 Oct 56

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*Yugoslavia*

## 5. YUGOSLAV ARREST OF DJILAS

### Comment on:

■ FBIS

20 Nov 56

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The arrest in Belgrade on 19 November of former Yugoslav vice president Djilas may be designed to counter any Soviet criticism during the current Belgrade-Moscow controversy that Yugoslavia is no longer a true supporter of world Communism. Belgrade presumably foresees an increasingly difficult period in its relations with Moscow following Tito's critical speech of 11 November and Pravda's rejoinder on 19 November.

Djilas' detention arose from the publication in the American press of his article which described the Hungarian revolt as the "beginning of the end of Communism generally." There have been no signs of serious unrest in Yugoslavia in the wake of Hungarian events, but Djilas is presumably viewed by the regime as a natural rallying point for those forces opposing the Belgrade Communist government. Tito stated in his 11 November speech that Yugoslavia is "united and strong," but "we must not allow various characters and elements to speak all sorts of nonsense."

Djilas was purged in 1954 for advocating greater freedom in Yugoslavia and was arrested in early 1955 on charges of conspiring against the state when he called for the establishment of a two-party system in Yugoslavia in an interview with a Western correspondent. He was at that time given an 18-month sentence, but placed on probation for three years. ■

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Yugoslavia

5. YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT NATIONALIST  
MOVEMENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

Comment on:

US Emb Warsaw  
27 Oct 56

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

US Emb Belgrade  
25, 27 Oct 56

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US Emb Belgrade  
26, 28 Oct 56

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Yugoslav press accounts [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] show that the Tito regime is continuing its support of changes in Poland and Hungary. The Yugoslavs are somewhat critical of the failure of the Kadar-Nagy forces to act sooner against the members of the old Rakosi group that remained in power, but believe the Hungarian leadership is in tune with the demands of the masses. Belgrade asserts the Hungarian leaders must carry out their new program decisively if they are to hold popular sup-

port, indicating that Nagy would have to live down the fact that he had called for the intervention of Soviet troops.

A high Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official on 28 October said that the Nagy government is still taking "half measures." It should take in representatives of all Hungarian mass organizations, even possibly the Social Democrats. He felt that Poland and Hungary may in certain respects go beyond Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia "can learn from their experiences."

The Yugoslav press appears somewhat sensitive to the reaction its views might cause in Moscow. It has reported without comment the intervention of Soviet troops.

There is little doubt among Yugoslav officials that Soviet troops will have to be withdrawn, possibly first from Hungary and then from Poland. [REDACTED]

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*Yugoslavia*

1. YUGOSLAVS ADMIT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WITH  
THE ~~USSR~~

Comment on:

US Emb Belgrade  
30 Sept 56

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High Yugoslav officials now admit that the Soviets have been undermining Yugoslav relations with the Satellites, [REDACTED]

Yugoslav foreign under secretary Prica told [REDACTED] on 29 September that the attitude of Soviet party boss Khrushchev in his talks in Brioni had been an uncompromising reversal of the 20th Communist Party congress doctrine, on the "many roads to socialism." When Tito threatened to publish their respective positions, Khrushchev invited him to the USSR to discuss their differences with the Soviet leaders. Prica added that the Soviet leaders apparently had expected that Yugoslavia would return to the Soviet fold and were now worried about the effect of their policy of liberalization in the Satellites. Molotov and others had always opposed the policy and the great majority of the Soviet presidium and central committee, including Khrushchev, now support Molotov's views. Prica stated this had created such a wide gap between Soviet and Yugoslav ideas on socialism that it could never be bridged.

[REDACTED] concludes that this development, if as described, must be a bitter blow to Tito, who has predicted fundamental changes in the USSR in justifying his foreign policy.

Comment

Because of the extent of the ideological differences, any durable Yugoslav-Soviet compromise is unlikely, although both sides will try to avoid another open split.

Tito's visit to the USSR, despite the unfavorable Western reaction he feared would result, indicates that he feels he must make every effort to protect Yugoslavia's growing prestige in Eastern Europe.

3 Oct 56

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*Yugoslavia*

**2. TITO REITERATES CRITICISM OF CERTAIN  
SATELLITE LEADERS**

█/FBIS  
27 June 56

President Tito in a speech on his return to Belgrade on 27 June said further self-criticism on the part of "individual leaders" in some of the East European countries was necessary before Yugoslavia could conclude agreements similar to those signed with the USSR and Rumania. He alluded in particular to a "certain reserve" on the part of the individual Eastern European leaders, who "find it hard to say what must be said and who think that their prestige will suffer if they say it."

**Comment**


Tito's remarks are presumably directed at the Communist leaders of Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania who, in the Yugoslav view, still have not made adequate accommodation to Belgrade's new relationship with Moscow.

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*Yugoslavia*



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
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*Yugoslavia*



9 May 56

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2. YUGOSLAVS PLEASED WITH SOVIET 20TH PARTY CONGRESS DEVELOPMENTS

US Emb Belgrade  
24 Feb 56

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The general reaction in Belgrade to the Soviet 20th Party Congress is favorable, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Yugoslavs seem now to believe that the USSR has definitely endorsed the principle of different roads to socialism. The Yugoslavs particularly approve the condemnation of Stalinism and Khrushchev's reference to parliamentary methods as a means of achieving socialism. They conclude that the Soviet "threat" is no longer imminent if in fact it exists at all.

[REDACTED] observes that in spite of Yugoslav efforts to minimize to Western officials the importance of Tito's message to the Soviet congress, the Yugoslavs regard it as of major significance. A Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official denied that the message indicated anything with regard to party relations, which he insisted had "not yet" been established.

Comment

Developments at the Soviet party congress appear to have gone a long way toward removing the obstacles that Yugoslav leaders felt were in the way of re-establishing official ties with the Soviet party.

The Belgrade press has applauded practically all the proceedings in Moscow, and cited them as proof of the Yugoslav view that the Soviet leaders have set their country on a new orientation.

[REDACTED], Yugoslav officials have maintained that it is now the West that is "inflexible" and the Soviet Union that is showing "flexibility," particularly through its generous offers to Belgrade.


28 Feb 56

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27 February 1956

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*x Daily Intelligence Briefing*

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*Yugoslavia*

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2. TITO'S MESSAGE TO SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Comment on:

██████████ FBIS  
17, 19 Feb 56

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Yugoslav president Tito's message of greetings to the "comrades" at the Soviet party congress is the first public response by the

Yugoslav Communist Party to Soviet overtures for inter-party ties. His message calls for "all progressive forces in the world" to strengthen themselves to prevent new wars, praises Soviet economic progress, and makes approving references to the visit of the Soviet leaders to Yugoslavia.

Tito, at the same time, appears to add one note of caution in his message. He mentions that a gradual approach to improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations is the best one for the restoration of trust and co-operation and provides for the possibility of eliminating "all those elements which could prevent the strengthening of our mutual confidence."

Preliminary Yugoslav reaction to the Soviet party congress has been gratification that many Soviet views are now similar to those of Yugoslavia. Belgrade has probably gained particular satisfaction from the statement by Khrushchev that socialism could be attained through parliamentary means, since the Soviet leaders, when in Belgrade, are reliably reported to have rejected the Yugoslav concept that socialism can be attained through evolution. ██████████

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21 Feb 56

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